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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT POINT IA - Appellant contends that boundary by 
acquiescence requires an objective uncertainty in the deed. 
However there was none until 1973 when appellant recorded the 
deed at issue with the statement "Subject to a fence line 
encroachment". 
ARGUMENT POINT IB - Appellant contends that the respondent 
has failed to show objective uncertainty in record title and 
appellants have conclusively negated any existence of 
obj ective uncertainty. 
ARGUMENT POINT IC - Appellants contend that though boundary 
by acquiescence requires an agreement between the parties, 
none was shown. 
ARGUMENT POINT ID - Appellant contends that respondents have 
failed to meet not only one, but two elements of boundary by 
acquiescence, i.e. there was no objective uncertainty in the 
record title, and there is no showing of an agreement between 
the parties. 
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FACTS 
One fact which should be made abundantly clear is 
respondents1 blatant attempt to distort the facts, including 
such phrases as on page 5 "Since its purchase Defendant has 
developed its land into an apartment house complex" . . . and 
on page 11 "The Plaintiff has not occupied East of the 
fenceline and that the disputed property is part of 
Defendant's apartment house complex." Respondent continues 
to attempt to make it appear as though this lawsuit 
encroaches upon an apartment complex when in fact the 
apartment complex was built after the suit was filed and 
Respondents are attempting to encroach upon the Appellant's 
land. 
This lawsuit was instigated shortly after Appellant 
discovered in 1983 that someone was claiming an interest in 
land she thought she owned. Both Appellant's land and 
Respondent's land were deserted fields and the survey taken 
in 197 9 did not show a fence but remnants of a fence. The 
Appellant has always maintained that since she has owned the 
property she thought it went out to the edge of a neighbors' 
fence which meets the metes and bounds description of 
Appellant's deed. 
In fact, Respondent submitted a proposal for approval 
when building its apartment building which excluded the 
disputed portion. Appellant's understanding is that that 
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proposal was denied by the city. 
Negotiations between the Appellant and Respondent in the 
latter part of 1983 proved fruitless, this suit was filed in 
1984 shortly after, 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1A 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE REQUIRES AN 
OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY IN THE DEED WHICH 
THERE WAS NONE UNTIL 1973 WHEN HANCOCK 
RECORDED THE DEED WITH THE STATEMENT 
"SUBJECT TO A FENCE LINE ENCROACHMENT". 
The seminole case on the issues presented at the trial 
is Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (1984). The Supreme Court 
outlines with great particularity the rules provided for 
obtaining property by using the theory of boundary by 
acquiescence. It is an important case too because it changes 
the law in the state with an emphatic pronouncement about 
fence disputes. 
The court speaks at length about "on the ground" versus 
"in the county records" claims to property. 
The Supreme Court terms what is known as "objective 
uncertainty" in the record title before the doctrine is 
applicable. The court ruled: 
Under the rule as we have defined it 
here, the property line shown on the 
record title cannot be displaced by 
another boundary unless it is shown that 
during the period of acquiescence there 
was some objectively measurabl e circum-
stance in the record title or in the 
reasonably available survey information 
(or other technique by which record title 
information was located on the ground) 
that would have prevented a landowner, as 
a practical matter, from being reasonably 
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certain about the true location of the 
boundary. (Underlining mine.) 
685 P. 2d at 505. The law was slowly evolving in this 
direction in San Juan County v. Grand County, 371 P.2d 855 
(1962) and Carter v. Linder, 460 P. 2d 830 (Utah 1969). The 
law made it clear in Halladay Supra. , however, that you look 
for an objective uncertainty in the record title before the 
doctrine is applicable. Halladay, was affirmed Parsons v. 
Anderson, 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984) and Stratford v. Morgan, 
689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984). 
First, in the case at bar this court ruled that the 
deeds as recorded were not ambiguous. They describe the 
property as Appellant contends the property ought to be 
described. The record of acquiescence can only begin after 
an ambiguity or 'objective uncertainty' is found in the 
record title and in the case at bar all deeds describe the 
property as Appellant contends except for the deed to Mrs. 
Hancock in 1973 which sets forth the statement "Subject to a 
fence line encroachment." The Appellant's immediate pre-
decessor has no such phrase in her deed. The Respondent's 
claim by acquiescence fails because the Supreme Court of Utah 
in Halladay, supra, ruled "a claimant cannot assert boundary 
by acquiescence if he or his predecessors in title had reason 
to know the true location of the boundary during the period 
of acquiescence." 685 P.2d at 505. 
POINT IB 
RESPONDENT FAILED IN ITS BURDEN OF 
SHOWING 
TITLE 
'OBJECTIVE 
AND 
UNCERTAINTY' 
APPELLANT HAS 
IN RECORD 
CONCLUSIVELY 
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NEGATED ANY EXISTENCE OF OBJECTIVE UN-
CERTAINTY. 
The Supreme Court in the Halladay, supra, case stated: 
This case involves property in the 
city of Provo, where survey information 
is readily available. It is therefore 
reasonable for the law to require the 
parties in this case to locate their 
property lines on the ground by means of 
the record title and reasonably available 
survey information rather than by ac-
quiescence in a fence line or other 
idendifiable points on the ground. Con-
sequently, as to this circumstance we 
hold that the party claiming boundary by 
acquiescence has the burden of proving 
objective uncertainty as part of the 
prima facie elements of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. Notwith-
standing this allocation of the burden of 
proof, the record landowner may, of 
course conclusively negate the existence 
of objective uncertainty by proving that 
the claimant or his predecessors in title 
had reason to know the location of the 
true boundary before the expiration of 
the period of acquiescence. (Underlining 
mine.) 
685 P. 2d at 507. The underlined portion sets forth the 
contention wherein the deeds prior to the Hancock deed 
clearly conveyed title with no uncertainty. And the 
Respondents were notified prior to a time when any acquies-
cence period could have run. 
POINT IC 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE REQUIRES AN 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND NONE 
WAS SHOWN. 
Respondents put John Miller on the stand from the state 
of Utah. He stated the land had been occupied but indicated 
neither he nor the state made an agreement with anybody about 
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where the boundary was. The court stated simply that the 
parties involved treated the fence as the boundary line. 
There was absolutely no evidence anyone agreed to this as 
being the case. 
To the contrary, over Appellant's counsel's objection 
Respondent put on evidence about a dispute Respondent had 
over the property with the Ashcroft's on the south of 
Appellant's property and Norm Thompson on the north of 
Appellant's property over this same 34' and Ashcroft quit 
claimed his to the Respondent. Neither remotely suggests 
agreement but rather a dispute. Without an agreement the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence simply does not apply. 
The reason being that to allow it to be so would defeat the 
statute of frauds and people could, through oral agreement, 
convey property. 
This issue is addressed in Halladay, supra. , in dicta 
the court discusses boundary by acquiescence and boundary by 
parol agreement and the blurring of the two. 
In the case of Madsen v. Clegg, supra, the court stated 
as follows: 
However, when the evidence fails to 
support any implication that a fence had 
been erected by adjoining owners pursuant 
to an agreement between them as to the 
location of the boundary, the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence has no applica-
tion. ... In the absence of any initial 
uncertainty concerning the ownership of 
the property in question, the Doctrine of 
Boundary by acquiescence has no applica-
tion. 
Even if the trial court had found that 
_ e _ 
uncertainty existed concerning the cor-
rect boundary line, it could not have 
resolved such uncertainty on the basis of 
defendant's acquiescence theory, because 
the evidence simply fails to support any 
finding of an agreement between the 
parties. (Underlining mine.) 
639 P.2d at 729. The deeds conveying title in this case were 
recorded in 1904. A fence was erected 25f onto the 
plaintiffs' property by the plaintiff's father. There was 
also a fence which ran down the property line which was torn 
down. Defendant and his predecessors in interest farmed the 
disputed area from 1930 without obtaining plaintiffs' 
permission. Plaintiff had however, continued to pay taxes. 
The court stated: "Plaintiffs' testimony, his payment of 
taxes on the disputed property, his use of the property to 
trap muscrats and his drilling of a well on the property all 
show that he did not acquiesce in defendant's claim of 
ownership." (Underlining mine.) The payment of taxes in 
this case helped to pursuade the court that the parties had 
not agreed to the fence as a boundary. This is the same fact 
present in Appellant's action. Appellant paid taxes on the 
disputed portion. Appellant testified in her deposition that 
when she purchased the property she stepped it off and as to 
her there was no visible fence. This fact is backed by John 
Bradshaw who testified all that was present in 1978 when he 
surveyed the property, were a few posts and some wire which 
were laying down, not a continuous fence the length of the 
property. 
Additionally, John Miller testified that the primary 
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purpose of the fence was to keep cattle in. This in no way 
establishes acquiescence in the fence being the boundary. 
See Leon v. Dansie, 639 P.2d 730 (Utah 1981) where the 
Supreme Court stated: 
The clear weight of the evidence also 
showed that although there was a fence in 
place far in excess of the prescriptive 
or adverse possession periods necessary 
to acquire enforceable new title, the 
almost complete concurrence of all the 
witnesses on both sides, was to the 
effect that the fence was used primarily 
to contain livestock from the field 
below. The record title clearly was 
shown to be in the plaintiffs at the 
outset and thereafter, which was con-
firmed many years later by an official 
survey. 
639 P.2d at 731. See also Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 
(Utah 1979). The only evidence in the case at bar was that 
the fence existed there for many years. One court held that 
the landowners long acquiescence in the existence of a fence 
did not, by itself, create an implied agreement establishing 
a boundary between ajoining parties. Christie v. Papke, 657 
P.2d 88 (Mont. 1982). Another court held the absence of 
evidence that previous owners of first adjoining landowner's 
land accepted fence line north of south boundary line as 
boundary between two adjoining properties, evidence that 
bank, or prior trustee of one-half interest in the land had 
seen improvements made by second adjoining landowner was 
aware of the fence and improvements when he purchased the 
land was insufficient to support location of boundary at 
fence line on basis of doctrine of acquiescence in a common 
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boundary. Lamble v. Beals, 631 P.2d 1311 (1981). See also a 
Utah case Florence v. Hiline, 581 P.2d 998 (Utah). Parsons 
v. Anderson, 690 P. 2d 535 (Utah 1984) (Utah Supreme court 
held against the fence line stating: "Testimony at trial 
indicated that there was a redwood fence on the property in 
1957 and at least partially thereafter. There was no 
evidence presented as to who built the fence, when it was 
built or why it was built." 690 P.2d at 539.) This is the 
state of the evidence in the case at bar. The fence was 
there in 194-8, but no one knows who built it and it was clear 
from the testimony it was to hold in cattle. There is no 
evidence in the case at bar that the property owners 
considered it a boundary. 
Appellant would submit to the court that an inference 
that the mere existence of the fence established an agreement 
between the parties that it was the boundary would be 
speculative at best. Respondents put on evidence to show 
where it agreed the boundary was but show nothing that 
Appellant or her predecessors in interest agreed to the 
boundary. 
POINT ID 
FAILURE TO MEET ONE ELEMENT OF BOUNDARY 
BY ACQUIESCENCE IS FATAL TO RESPONDENT'S 
CLAIM. 
In Utah, the Supreme Court ruled in Hales v. Frakes, 600 
P. 2d 556 (1979) that one element missing defeats a claim of 
boundary by acquiescence. Appellant contends Respondent 
failed in two respects. First, there was no objective 
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uncertainty in the record title- Second, there is absolutely 
no showing of an agreement. At best, Respondent shows the 
existence of a fence for the purpose of keeping cattle in 
over a long period of time. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent's claim to title of the disputed area cannot 
be found in contested limitations to the Appellant's deed. 
Since Halladay, the law is clear that you look to the 
recorded title for an objective uncertainty before the 
doctrine of acquiescence applies. This case drastically 
altered the application of the doctrine in this state. 
Absent the uncertainty, Appellant has good title. The title 
to Beth Carr and all predecessors show no ambiguity in the 
title to the property and the boundary lines. These deeds 
run down the section line. 
Since Beth Carr is the rightful owner of the property 
under Halladay she is also the only one who can convey title. 
She has conveyed nothing to the Respondents. In the chain of 
title to the property, there is no common grantor which 
creates a stricter review of the boundary by metes and 
bounds. Respondent's only claim to the property was created 
at the direction of its predecessor in interest in 1979. 
In 1979, the law in Utah may have given the Respondents 
a better argument but since Halladay in 1984, they have none. 
The Court should require the description to be spec-
ifically described to exclude the general language of 
"Subject to a fence line encroachment along the east line" or 
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the district court should be required to rehear the specific 
issues associated with the quit claim deed and render a 
ruling. 
DATED this <^ >> day of , !^r 
Respectfully submitted, ' 
\ Paul Stockdale 
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